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I. Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon
1
 inserted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the existing framework 
of a broadened Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Article 206 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
2
 now provides in a programmatic fashion:  
“By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall 
contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct 
investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers.” 
Article 207(1) TFEU is the central provision regarding the EU’s competence in the field of 
the CCP. It expressly lists various aspects of the CCP, now adding FDI matters to the treaty-
making power:  
“The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements 
relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of 
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted 
in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action.” 
As regards FDI matters to be negotiated and concluded under the new CCP, Article 207(4) 
first subparagraph TFEU provides for a special unanimity requirement:  
“For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the 
Council shall act by a qualified majority. For the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously 
where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the 
adoption of internal rules.” 
These provisions correspond largely to the proposals that were already discussed during the 
drafting of a Constitution Treaty.
3
 Even then it was suggested that FDI should be added to the 
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existing external trade powers, comprising trade in goods, services and intellectual property 
rights along the WTO-determined enlarged trade issues after the Uruguay Round.
4
 While the 
extension to investment issues received some vigorous rejection by high-level state 
negotiators,
5
 the matter did not appear to have attracted further attention during the 
subsequent negotiations. Also when the question of the enlargement of the EU’s external 
trade powers was revived during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations, investment seemed to have 
received no particular attention.   
II. The scope of the new investment powers of the EU under an enlarged CCP 
When EU Member States realized that the EU had gained a broad new investment 
competence as a result of the express inclusion of FDI into the treaty-making powers relating 
to the CCP, many of them tried to defend the remaining powers which they had enjoyed so far 
as part of their national investment protection policies. This also led to a lively academic 
debate about the scope of the new EU investment powers.
6
 On the one hand, it was argued 
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that the EU’s investment powers would be limited to aspects concerning the admission of 
investments and not extend to traditional investment protection once an investment was made. 
On the other hand, the express choice of the term FDI was interpreted as limiting the EU’s 
powers to FDI, excluding portfolio investments traditionally covered by modern investment 
treaties.
7
 Both limitations would lead to a situation of de facto shared control between the EU 
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and its Member States, as they would require the conclusion of so-called mixed agreements to 
be negotiated and concluded by both the EU and its Member States.
8
 Thus, the question was 
everything but “academic”. This limiting interpretation of the new investment powers of the 
EU was supported by valid arguments. The EU’s and earlier the EC’s CCP powers were 
traditionally aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade in order to pursue its trade 
liberalization credo. Previous enlargements of the CCP in the field of services were 
interpreted restrictively by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), limiting the EC’s power to 
the cross-border (trade equivalent) mode of supply in the language of the GATS.
9
 And 
traditionally, the EC/EU acted in the field of investment only as regards liberalization and 
access/admission rules, as was evident in the so-called Minimum Platform on Investment,
10
 as 
well as ensuing trade negotiations with third countries that incorporated investment 
liberalization, but excluded post-establishment investment protection.
11
 This limiting 
interpretation could also find support in the language of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, in 
particular Article 206 TFEU which speaks of the “progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade and on foreign direct investment”, suggesting that the CCP is primarily 
concerned with access/admission aspects. By comparison Article 207(1) TFEU is more 
ambiguously worded. Its reference to the “conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating 
to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign 
direct investment, […]” can be read as support of the limiting interpretation if one 
understands that “foreign direct investment” is the other subject-matter “the commercial 
aspects of” which may be addressed in CCP treaties. However, it is equally plausible to 
consider that “foreign direct investment” is the third field of “trade agreements” the EU may 
enter into, after those “relating to trade in goods and services” and those relating to “the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property”.  
Not surprisingly, it is this latter reading which is vigorously adopted by the EU Commission. 
The Commission considers that the EU’s investment power is not limited to the 
access/admission questions regarding investments. Rather, it comprises both the pre-
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establishment as well as the post-establishment phase and would thus allow the EU to 
conclude treaties containing the traditional substantive treatment obligations of IIAs and 
procedural guarantees in the form of state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS), albeit in the adapted version of allowing the EU to (partly) replace its Member States 
as respondent.
12
 The EU Commission equally rejects a narrow reading of its investment 
powers as powers limited to FDI. Though the wording, and thus the “ordinary meaning”, of 
the TFEU appears to be clear, the Commission in particular asserts that the EU’s investment 
power also includes an implied power concerning portfolio investments.
13
   
A separate but related issue is the question whether the new investment power of the EU 
implies that BITs between Member States have become incompatible with EU Law and may 
have to be terminated.
14
 While the Commission has clearly expressed this view,
15
 investment 
tribunals have generally upheld their jurisdiction based on the continued validity of so-called 
intra-EU-BITs.
16
  
III. The start of the debate on future EU IIAs 
As outlined above, the immediate aftermath of the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty was 
dominated by the debate between the EU Commission and the EU Member States on the 
appropriate division of their respective powers in the field of investment. Much time and 
effort was spent on both sides to claim and to defend treaty-making powers as regards IIAs 
with third states which may have prevented them to devote sufficient energy to the fashioning 
of a new investment policy of the Union. The official and publicly available documents in this 
direction are still rather limited.  
In July 2010, two Commission documents were made public. One is a Draft Regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral 
investment treaties between Member States and third countries;
17
 the other is a 
Communication outlining the future EU investment policy.
18
 This was followed by a 
Commission proposal in summer 2012 on a regulation addressing the issue of allocating 
financial responsibility between the EU and its Member States in case of investment 
arbitration.
19
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The Commission’s International Investment Policy Communication received comments by 
the other EU institutions, most importantly among them were the Council Conclusions of 25 
October 2010
20
 and the European Parliament’s resolution of 6 April 2011,21 adopting a report 
of its International Trade Committee of 22 March 2011.
22
 On 5 July 2011, the Commission 
adopted a Follow up to this resolution.
23
 However, as of December 2012, the proposals have 
not led to the adoption of any formal legal instrument and, in particular, they have not yet 
been accompanied by a clear indication on the part of the EU how it intends to use its new 
investment power in order to structure future IIAs.
24
 Thus, any assessments on the path the 
EU is likely to follow as regards IIAs must be based on inferences drawn from the scarce 
proposals available and some informally leaked documents from the negotiating process of 
comprehensive trade agreements with third states the EU Commission is currently engaged in.  
At present, it is difficult to ascertain any clear directions from the three main EU players 
concerning future EU IIAs. Nevertheless, certain general positions have become apparent by 
now. While the Commission seems intent to assert its broad new investment powers as a 
question of principle, it is struggling to provide content to its exercise. Gradually, this content 
takes shape and now seems to encompass, in addition to market access provisions, all 
traditional investment protection standards, including ISDS. The position of the Council 
reflects the diverse interests of the Member States, which it represents in their entirety, 
ranging from those states which would prefer to keep the status quo ante and thus their sole 
responsibility for the conclusion of investment protection treaties to those which are content 
with the Lisbon shift of powers to the EU. The Council’s compromise position appears to be 
its insistence on investment as an area of mixed competences between the Union and its 
members. As regards the substance of the EU’s future IIA policy, the Council seems to favour 
a traditional “European” approach of strong investment protection including ISDS. The 
European Parliament equally has to find its new role after the Lisbon Treaty amendments of 
the CCP which gave it the right to be consulted during negotiations and requires its consent 
for treaty conclusions. While siding with the Commission in demanding broad investment 
powers for the EU, the Parliament seems to be developing its own position on the contents of 
future EU IIAs. In particular, it appears much more reluctant towards the traditional strong 
investor protection contained in many European BITs and has called for sufficient attention to 
be given to non-investment interests as well as the Union’s right to regulate and pursue its 
policies without being hampered by concerns over investment claims. Thus, the Parliament’s 
position on investment protection including ISDS is much more nuanced, if not reserved, than 
that of the two other main EU institutions.  
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IV. Current EU negotiations on IIAs or investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) 
Making use of the EU’s new investment treaty-making power, the EU Commission is 
currently engaged in negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore on comprehensive trade 
agreements which will include an investment chapter.
25
 Though reports about the negotiating 
process are limited, some information can be gleaned from excerpts of the confidential 
Negotiating Directives issued by the Council which have been made public by NGOs.  
For instance, the Council Negotiating Directives of 12 September 2011
26
 concerning the 
negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore contain valuable information on the EU’s 
official position with regard to a number of investment related issues. They comprise 
information confirming the EU Commission position that the EU now has a comprehensive 
investment power by outlining that an investment chapter should include fair and equitable 
treatment (FET), full protection and security, national treatment and most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) treatment as well as guarantees against uncompensated expropriation and an umbrella 
clause. As regards the level of detail, the instructions appear to favour the traditional 
European approach by adhering to a rather concise treaty text, without clarifications limiting 
the scope of FET and indirect expropriation as they are know from US and Canadian BITs as 
well as NAFTA.
27
 In fact, avoidance of “NAFTA-contamination” was reportedly a specific 
wish of some Member State officials.
28
 With regard to dispute settlement, the need for direct 
investor-state arbitration seems to be unquestioned, though the precise contours are still open 
given the difficulty of access to ICSID (and ICSID Additional Facility) dispute settlement 
which appear to be the Commission’s favourite venues.29  
Other negotiations announced in the Commission’s 2010 Communication, such as those with 
China and potentially Russia,
30
 have not yet materialized to an extent that would allow precise 
conclusions as to the emerging contours of future EU IIAs.  
V. The emerging contours of future EU IIAs 
Though the precise shape of EU investment agreements as currently negotiated with Canada, 
India and Singapore remains open to be finalized, the past negotiation process and, in 
particular, the Council Negotiating Directives concerning these states together with other 
official statements, in particular the 2010 Commission Communication on an international 
investment policy of the EU, permit the observer to make some inferences.  
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In general, it seems that by now the EU is determined to seek a high level of protection for its 
investors abroad. The Council has acknowledged this aim by calling for “the highest possible 
level of legal protection and certainty for European investors in Canada/India/Singapore”31 
and Commission officials have asserted that the Commission would “go for the ‘gold 
standard’ of investment protection provisions,”32 based on the existing practice of EU 
Member States.
33
 This indicates the awareness of the need to go beyond a common lowest 
denominator when drafting future investment agreements.
34
 While expecting that such a high 
level of investor protection will “increase Europe’s attractiveness as a destination for foreign 
investment,”35 the 2010 Commission Communication36 as well as the Council Negotiating 
Directives also admonish the need to guarantee an appropriate regulatory space for the EU 
and its Member States by cautioning that an EU investment agreement “shall be without 
prejudice to the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance 
with their respective competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a non-
discriminatory manner.”37  
A. The scope of future EU IIAs  
As regards the scope of future investment agreements, the EU obviously plans to adhere to the 
concept of modern investment agreement practice to include both FDI and portfolio 
investments,
38
 even if this comes at the price of not being able to exercise an exclusive CCP 
competence.
39
 Indeed, investment agreements limited to FDI would be highly unusual and – 
because of the difficulty in distinguishing between FDI and portfolio investments in specific 
cases – might lead to protracted jurisdictional disputes not in the interest of investment 
protection. According to the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
31
 Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26.  
32
 Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, “From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements”, supra note 6, 
70.  
33
 Also the 2010 Commission Communication repeatedly mentions member State BIT provisions “that should 
inspire the negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level.” Commission Communication, COM (2010) 
343 final 4, supra note 18, 8 (concerning umbrella clauses). Similarly, the Council considered that “provisions of 
future EU investment agreements” should be fleshed out “on the basis of the experience and the best practices of 
the Member States.” Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 20, para. 15. Also 
the EP considered “that future investment agreements concluded by the EU should be based on the best practices 
drawn from Member State experiences.” Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 19. 
34
 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, expressly state that the 
provisions of the investment chapters to be negotiated “shall be built upon the Member States’ experience and 
best practise regarding their bilateral investment agreements.” 
35
 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26.  
36
 In order to allow the EU to pursue public policy objectives, the Commission Communication, COM (2010) 
343 final 4, supra note 18, 8, recalls “that the Union’s trade and investment policy has to fit with the way the EU 
and its Member States regulate economic activity within the Union and across our borders. Investment 
agreements should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies 
on the protection of the environment, decent work, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural 
diversity, development policy and competition policy.” 
37
 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26. As to the need to balance 
investor protection and the regulatory freedom of host states, see infra text starting at note 153.  
38
 See supra note 13.  
39
 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, state that the Commission 
should aim at including “into the investment protection chapter of the agreement areas of mixed competence, 
such as portfolio investment, […].” For a more expansive interpretation of the EU’s powers, see the 
Commission’s view supra note 13.  
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Singapore, the investment protection chapters of these agreements “shall cover a broad range 
of investors and their investments, intellectual property rights included, whether the 
investment is made before or after the entry into force of the agreement.”40 Commentators 
have equally stressed that the EU should strive for a “broad definition of investment with a 
non-exhaustive list”.41 This would imply that future EU IIAs are likely to contain a broad 
asset-based definition of “investment” as currently contained in most EU Member State BITs. 
Uncertainty may stem from the fact that the EP has expressly called for the exclusion of 
“speculative forms of investment”.42 In practice it would appear difficult to distinguish 
between “speculative” and “non-speculative” portfolio (or even direct) investment.43  
B. Admission/access provisions  
Past agreements of the EC/EU dealing with investments largely addressed questions of 
admission only and did so by adopting a GATS-inspired market access approach, i.e. making 
specific commitments in specific areas.
44
 The EU institutions have in general confirmed their 
intention to continue this policy of market access/liberalisation.
45
 However, it is unclear 
whether the current market access approach will be continued or whether the EU will adopt 
the North American practice of extending national treatment to the admission phase in order 
to secure market access as found in NAFTA as well as US and Canadian BITs.
46
  
C. Substantive investment protection   
As regards substantive treatment of investments, it appears that future EU IIAs will include all 
the standards of treatment currently contained in EU Member State BITs. Again, the Council 
Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore are most instructive in this regard 
because they are most detailed. They contain basically all the treatment standards that can be 
found in modern BITs, from FET, full protection and security, national treatment and MFN, 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
40
 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, under “Scope”.  
41
 Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, “From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements”, supra note 6, 
71. 
42
 See Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 11.  
43
 See in detail infra text at note 109.  
44
 CITE LIT ##. See e.g. the provisions on “commercial presence” of Article 65 et seq. Economic Partnership 
Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member 
States, of the other part, OJ L 289/I/4 (November 30, 2008) 1, as well as Section C of Chapter 7 of the EU-Korea 
FTA, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ L 127 (May 14, 2011) 6, which provides for MFN treatment and specific 
market access commitments and national treatment in separate schedules.  
45
 See Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 5 (“[…] our trade policy will seek 
to integrate investment liberalisation and investment protection”); Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting, supra note 20, para. 6 (“The new EU international investment policy should increase the level 
of competitiveness of the Union and open new markets.”)  
46
 See e.g. Article 1102(1) North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of America (NAFTA) (Dec. 
17, 1992), 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (“Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”); Article 
3(1) Canadian Model FIPA 2004 (“Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.”). See also the discussion in St. Woolcock, “The EU Approach to International Investment Policy after 
the Lisbon Treaty”, Study for the EP Committee on International Trade 2010, 31 et seq.  
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to compensation guarantees in case of expropriation and free transfer obligations.
47
 In 
addition, they call for “rules concerning subrogation” which are typical in case an insurer 
compensates an investor and then needs to be able to raise claims against the host state.
48
  
1. Umbrella clauses 
The version of the leaked Negotiating Directives concerning Canada, India and Singapore is a 
bit more ambiguous with regard to umbrella clauses since they are mentioned with question 
marks under “other effective investment protection provisions”.49 Indeed, umbrella clauses 
have been controversial in investment arbitration practice as regards their practical effect.
50
 
Some tribunals follow the approach of SGS v. Pakistan which rejected the view that “breaches 
of a contract […] concluded with a State (widely considered to be a matter of municipal rather 
than international law) are automatically ‘elevated’ to the level of breaches of international 
law.”51 Other tribunals adhere to the traditional view endorsed by SGS v. Philippines that an 
umbrella clause “makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe binding 
commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has assumed with regard to 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
47
 Pursuant to the title “Standards of treatment” of the Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and 
Singapore), supra note 26, “the negotiations shall aim to include in particular but not exclusively the following 
standards of treatment and rules:  
a) fair and equitable treatment, including a prohibition of unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures, 
b) unqualified national treatment 
c) unqualified most-favoured nation treatment, 
d) protection against direct and indirect expropriation, including the right to prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation 
e) full protection and security of investors and investments, 
f) other effective protection provisions, such as ?umbrella clause? 
g) free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors 
h) rules concerning subrogation.”  
Except for subrogation provisions, all these standards can also be found in the Commission Communication, 
COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8-9. See also the Council Conclusions, 3041
st
 Foreign Affairs Council 
Meeting, supra note 20, para. 14, according to which the Council “STRESSES the need to ensure the inclusion 
in the substance of future negotiations of the fundamental standards of “fair and equitable treatment”, non-
discrimination (“most-favored-nation treatment” and “national treatment”), “full protection and security” 
treatment of investors and investments, protection against expropriation (including the right to prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation), free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors, as well as other 
effective protection provisions (such as, where appropriate, the so-called “umbrella clauses”) and dispute 
settlement mechanisms and CONSIDERS that these principles should be the main pillars of future EU 
investment agreements.” 
48
 See R. Dolzer and Ch. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2
nd
 ed., 2008) ##.   
49
 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, provide under “Standards 
of Treatment” (“f) other effective protection provisions, such as ?umbrella clause?”). 
50
 See C. Schreuer, “Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella. Clauses and Forks in the Road”, 5 
The Journal of World Investment and Trade 231 (2004); A. Sinclair, “The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the 
International Law of Investment Protection”, 20 Arbitration International 411 (2004); T. Wälde, “The 
“Umbrella” Clause on Investment Arbitration—A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases”, 6 The 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 183 (2005); S. Alexandrov, “Breaches of Contract and Breaches of 
Treaty – The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v 
Pakistan and SGS v Philippines”, 5 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 555 (2004). 
51
 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, para. 172. See also Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction of 15 November 2004; El 
Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para. 85; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 July 2006, para. 113. 
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specific investments. But it does not convert the issue of the extent or content of such 
obligations into an issue of international law.”52 It may be that the EU has not yet decided 
whether it would endorse the potentially far-reaching implications of an umbrella clause, 
though the 2010 Commission Communication suggest that umbrella clauses are regarded as 
valuable tools for the protection of contractual rights of investors.
53
  
2. Non-discrimination standards  
With regard to the main substantive standards it appears that the EU is determined to follow 
the path of traditional short formulations found in most EU Member State BITs, though it is 
difficult to judge this from the available documents alone. The wording of the Council 
Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore may be viewed as mere headings.
54
  
While the Commission has asserted that “non-discrimination should continue to be a key 
ingredient of EU investment negotiations,”55 it remains unclear whether future national 
treatment and MFN clauses should be limited to the post-establishment phase or extend to the 
admission phase, thus de facto allowing for market access.
56
   
On the basis of present EU documents it is also not clear whether the institutions have formed 
an opinion on whether a MFN clause should encompass dispute settlement as in the Maffezini 
case
57
 or not.
58
 This indecision may result from the fact that investment jurisprudence is 
highly inconsistent, with tribunals disagreeing sharply whether MFN clause should permitted 
claimants to invoke more favourable procedural, maybe even jurisdictional,
59
 provisions in 
third country BITs or at least to overcome procedural obstacles, such as waiting periods,
60
 or 
whether it would not permit so.
61
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
52
 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para. 128. See also Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, para. 53; Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, 
BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 29 May 2009.  
53
 Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8 (“They have been traditionally used 
in Member States BITs and are an important element among others that should inspire the negotiation of 
investment agreements at the EU level.”).  
54
 See text supra at note 47.  
55
 Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8.  
56
 As regards the different option to provide for market access, see supra text at note 44.  
57
 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000.  
58
 See also S. Fietta, “Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: A Turning Point?”, 8 Int’l Arb. L. Rev. (2005) 131-138; E. Gaillard, “Establishing Jurisdiction through 
a Most-Favored-Nation Clause”, 233 NYLJ (2005) 1, 3; K. Hobér, “MFN Clauses and Dispute Resolution in 
Investment Treaties: Have we reached the end of the road?”, in Ch. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and St. 
Wittich (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21
st
 Century (Oxford University Press, 2009) 31-41; A. 
Reinisch, “How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment Treaties?”, 2 J. Int’l Disp. 
Settlement (2011) 115-174. 
59
 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Award on Jurisdiction 2007, SCC Case No. Arb. V079/2005. 
60
 See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 
August 2004; Impreglio S.p.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011; 
Hochtief AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 October 2011.  
61
 In Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
8 February 2005, para. 223, the tribunal held that “an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by 
reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision 
in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.” The tribunal in 
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Finally, with regard to the Council’s directives suggesting that the Commission should 
negotiate “unqualified” national treatment and MFN provisions, it may be unclear whether 
this implies that such clauses should follow the traditional “European” approach of merely 
providing for non-discrimination
62
 or whether it would allow specifications to “like 
circumstances” as often found in North American IIAs63.64 However, the Parliament’s wish 
clearly suggests that such a specification should be adopted.
65
  
3. Fair and equitable treatment as well as full protection and security 
Concerning FET and full protection and security, the EU seems determined to continue the 
traditional IIA policy of its Member States to adopt short provisions. Already the 2010 
Commission Communication qualified these standards as “an important element among 
others that should inspire the negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level.”66 Indeed, 
there are good arguments in favour of the straightforward versions of FET omitting any 
references to the “international minimum standard”, as found in NAFTA,67 or US BITs,68 or 
qualifications of the full protection and security to include “legal protection”, as found in 
some German BITs
69
.
70
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, 8 December 2008, 
even denied the avoidance of waiting periods.  
62
 See e.g. Article 3(1) Austria/Ukraine BIT (“Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other 
Contracting Party and their investments treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to its own 
investors and their investments or to investors in third States and their investments.”).  
63
 See e.g. Article 3(1) Canadian Model FIPA 2004, text supra 46.  
64
 It was asserted that the express mandate in the Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore) 
that the non-discrimination standards of MFN and national treatment should be “unqualified” (see supra note 47) 
implied that they should not include any reference to “like circumstances” as they can be found e.g. in US and 
Canadian BITs as well as in NAFTA (See supra note 46). See Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, “From BITS and Pieces 
towards European Investment Agreements”, supra note 6, 71. However, it may also be that the intention merely 
was to clarify that the Council did not wish to have any conditional MFN or national treatment contained in the 
future investment chapters under negotiation. 
65
 Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 19 (“non-discrimination (national treatment and most favoured 
nation), with a more precise wording in the definition mentioning that foreign and national investors must 
operate ‘in like circumstances’.”). 
66
 Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8.  
67
 Article 1105 NAFTA (“Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”) In 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11 (2001) this was held to be co-
extensive, and thus limited, to the protection available under the international minimum standard (“1. Article 
1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum 
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 2. The concepts of ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”).  
68
 Article 5 US Model BIT 2004 (“1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance 
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.  
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and 
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.”) 
69
 Article 4 (1) Germany/Argentina BIT (“Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party 
shall enjoy full legal protection and full legal security in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”).  
70
 On the basis of such an express clause, the tribunal in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08, 
Award, 6 February 2007, para. 303, held that “[…] the obligation to provide full protection and security is wider 
than “physical” protection and security. It is difficult to understand how the physical security of an intangible 
13 
 
References to the “international minimum standard” in FET clauses have been regarded as 
limitations to the customary international law standard, in particular by NAFTA tribunals,
71
 
which have the potential to considerably lower the level of investor protection and, 
conversely, increase the regulatory discretion of host states. This latter consequence may have 
inspired the Parliament to call for the inclusion of FET clauses “defined on the basis of the 
level of treatment established by international customary law.”72 
4. Transfer clauses  
The Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore may again be relied 
upon to presume that future EU IIAs will routinely include guarantees on the “free transfer of 
funds of capital and payments by investors.”73 Already the 2010 Commission Communication 
stated that “EU clauses ensuring the free transfer of funds of capital and payments by 
investors should be included.”74 Given the Commission’s rigorous approach to defend the 
EU’s capacity to impose limits on such free transfer obligations for political reasons at any 
time,
75
 it is to be expected that future free transfer clauses will contain express exceptions 
allowing the EU legislator to adopt restrictive measures under Article 66
76
 and 215 TFEU.
77
 It 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
asset would be achieved. In the instant case, “security” is qualified by “legal”. In its ordinary meaning “legal 
security” has been defined as “the quality of the legal system which implies certainty in its norms and, 
consequently, their foreseeable application.”  
71
 See Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, ICSID Additional Facility Award, 11 
October 2002, para. 122; United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 
November 2002, para. 97; ADF Group Inc. v. USA, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, ICSID Additional Facility Award, 
9 January 2003, para. 199; Loewen v. USA, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003, paras. 125-
127; Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 2004, paras. 90-91; 
Methanex v. USA, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part II, Ch. H, para. 23. See also the 
interpretation of the 2001 NAFTA Free Commission, supra note 67.  
72
 Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 19. 
73
 Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, under “Standards of 
Treatment.” 
74
 Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 9. 
75
 Case C-205/06, European Commission v. Austria, ECJ, 3 March 2009, ECR I-1301; Case C-249/06, European 
Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, ECJ, 3 March 2009, ECR I-1335 Case C-118/07, European Commission v. 
Finland, ECJ, 19 November 2009, ECR I-10889. In these cases the ECJ found that even the mere possibility of a 
potential obstruction of the EU’s regulatory power to adopt transfer restrictions by capital transfer clauses in 
Member State BITs was sufficient to lead to an incompatibility with EU law. See also E. Denza, “Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and EU rules on free transfer: Comment on Commission v Austria, Commission v Sweden 
and Commission v Finland”, 35 ELRev. (2010) 263; N. Lavranos, “New Developments in the Interaction 
between International Investment Law and EU Law”, 9 Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 
(2010) 409; A. Reinisch, “European Court of Justice: Commission of the European Communities v. Austria and 
Sweden (March 3, 2009) Introductory Note”, 48 ILM (2009) 470-472.   
76
 Article 66 TFEU (“Where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital to or from third countries 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic and monetary union, the Council, 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Central Bank, may take safeguard 
measures with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are strictly 
necessary.”).  
77
 Article 215(1) TFEU (“Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial 
relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt 
the necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof.”). 
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has been suggested that such an exception could resemble the security exception of the EU-
Korea FTA.
78
  
5. Expropriation  
The question whether the EU has the power to adopt expropriation clauses in future IIAs has 
been controversial since the time the enlargement of the CCP was negotiated. While many 
commentators and apparently also EU Member States have referred to the exclusion of issues 
of property ownership from the scope of the TFEU and thus of the EU’s external investment 
power,
79
 the Commission seems determined to include expropriation among the topics the EU 
has the competence to deal with. Again the absence of any clear EU template makes it 
difficult to infer the precise scope and content of a potential EU expropriation clause. 
However, the pieces found in different documents may be put together to form a discernible 
mosaic. While the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore speak of 
“protection against direct and indirect expropriation, including the right to prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation”80, the 2010 Commission Communication admonishes that the 
“Union should include precise clauses covering this issue [i.e. that expropriation measures 
should be non-discriminatory and proportionate to attain their legitimate objective] into its 
own future investment or trade agreements.”81 It would thus appear that any future 
expropriation clauses are likely to closely resemble the clauses found in existing EU Member 
State BITs. Whether it will also contain an attempt to more closely define the notion of 
indirect expropriation, as can be found in some more recent North American BITs
82
 remains 
to be seen.
83
  
D. The place of investor-state dispute settlement in the EU’s investment 
architecture  
In the initial phase of the discussion of a new EU external investment policy, the EU’s 
institutions unsettled the investment community by their apparent reluctance towards 
investor-state dispute settlement. While the Commission was silent for a considerable period 
of time, it eventually came forward with a positive assessment. Still, the Parliament in 
particular voiced concern
84
 about the far-reaching implications of ISDS that might 
compromise the right to regulate.
85
  
                                                          
 
 
 
 
78
 See Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, “From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements”, supra note 
6, 73, referring to Article 15.9 of the EU-Korea FTA, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ L 127 (May 14, 2011) 6, 
which is in turn inspired by the Article XXI GATT. 
79
 See e.g. Ch. Tietje, “Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon”, 83 Beiträge 
zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 16; T. R. Braun, “Für einen komplementären, europäischen 
Investitionsschutz”, in M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel and S. Hindelang (eds.), Internationaler Investitionsschutz und 
Europarecht (Nomos 2010) 191-200, 195.  
80
 Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, under “Standards of 
Treatment.” 
81
 Commission Communication, COM(2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 9. 
82
 See e.g. the “shared understanding” on expropriation in Annex B US Model BIT 2004.  
83
 It appears that such a closer definition is what the Parliament would like to see in future IIAs when it called for 
“protection against direct and indirect expropriation, giving a definition that establishes a clear and fair balance 
between public welfare objectives and private interests.” Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 19.  
84
 Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 24 (“Expresses its deep concern regarding the level of discretion 
of international arbitrators to make a broad interpretation of investor protection clauses, thereby leading to the 
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This reserved stance was indeed irritating for states and investors which had accepted that 
ISDS fulfilled a crucial function in effectively securing the substantive protections granted in 
IIAs.
86
 With the coming of age of ISDS in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21
st
 century it 
has become accepted that removing investment protection from the traditional paradigm of 
diplomatic protection has contributed to the de-politicization of investment disputes.
87
  
Meanwhile, the initial reluctance of the EU institutions seems to have given way to a full 
endorsement of ISDS. In its 2010 Communication on investment, the Commission 
acknowledged the importance of ensuring the effective enforceability of investment 
protection standards through ISDS which formed “a key part of the inheritance that the Union 
receives from Member State BITs.”88 And the Council in its Conclusions stressed “the need 
for an effective investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism in the EU investment 
agreements.”89 
Currently, the Commission appears determined to include ISDS and has even specifically 
addressed the issue of allocating responsibility (and in particular financial liability) between 
the Union and its Member States by proposing a regulation establishing a “framework for 
managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals”.90 This 
proposal builds on and deepens the template adopted already in the mid-1990s when the EC 
joined the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
91
 as a full participant. Prior to the ECT’s entry-into-
force, the EC confirmed that it can become a respondent to individual claims raised by 
investors, and that the Community and its Member States concerned would determine the 
proper respondent within 30 days of receiving such a request among themselves.
92
 
In addition to the difficulty of allocating responsibility, ISDS raises serious problems as 
regards available arbitration venues. Investor-state arbitration and conciliation under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
ruling out of legitimate public regulations; calls on the Commission to produce clear definitions of investor 
protection standards in order to avoid such problems in the new investment agreements.”). 
85
 See also infra text at note 153.  
86
 See e.g. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 
2000, para. 54 (“[…] dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign 
investors, as they are also related to the protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce.”); National 
Grid plc v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction, 20 June 2006, para. 49 (“[…] assurance of 
independent international arbitration is an important – perhaps the most important – element in investor 
protection.”). 
87
 See already I. F.I. Shihata, “Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID 
and MIGA”, 1 ICSID Review – FILJ (1986) 1. In fact, the latter concept is considered to be one of the major 
achievements of the ICSID Convention. See e.g. C. Schreuer/L. Malintoppi/A. Reinisch/A. Sinclair, The ICSID 
Convention – A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2009) 416; C. Schreuer, “Investment 
Protection and International Relations”, in A. Reinisch/U. Kriebaum (eds.), The Law of International Relations – 
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ICSID Convention
93
 are available only to states and nationals of states parties to the 
Convention.
94
 Access to the ICSID Convention is open to member states of the IBRD or to 
any other state which is a party to the ICJ Statute.
95
 Thus, statehood is a clear requirement for 
adherence to the ICSID Convention which clearly prevents the EU in its current form from 
becoming a contracting party. Opening ICSID dispute settlement (conciliation and arbitration) 
to the EU would thus require a treaty revision which is theoretically possible,
96
 practically, 
however, very unlikely to be achieved.
97
 Nevertheless, the Commission stated its intention 
that it would explore this option.
98
 In the medium term, it appears more realistic that the EU 
will adopt ISDS clauses providing for investment arbitration to be conducted under 
UNCITRAL
99
 or other arbitration rules.
100
  
Interestingly, the Commission has reacted to two specific issues frequently discussed in the 
investment arbitration community that have raised a certain degree of concern, the questions 
of sufficient transparency
101
 and of potential inconsistencies of outcomes.
102
 The Commission 
appears intent on addressing these problems by providing for a broad level of transparency in 
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its future IIAs
103
 and by taking into consideration the use of quasi-permanent arbitrators and 
the creation of appellate mechanisms.
104
 The Parliament endorsed these thoughts and added 
further ideas for improvement,
105
 such as the institutionalisation of amicus curiae 
participation
106
 and the more controversial enhancement of the role of domestic courts 
through requiring exhaustion of local remedies.
107
 
VI. Controversial Issues  
As the preceding sections have shown an EU investment policy is gradually developing. 
However, there still remain many open issues some of which will be analysed in more detail 
in the following pages.  
The precise scope of exclusive IIA powers after Lisbon remains unclear. Both the Union and 
its Member States – and apparently both the Commission and the Council – seem to pursue a 
broad approach towards future EU IIAs with regard to the inclusion of FDI as well as of 
provisions on expropriation and ISDS. They do so in a pragmatic way by proceeding on the 
basis of a mixed agreement without clearly determining their respective spheres of 
competences. However, that fact can only insufficiently veil the continuing divergences of 
opinions as to the true allocation of powers which also relates to the question of who is 
empowered to regulate questions concerning expropriation in future EU IIAs. Another highly 
contentious issue concerns the future of intra-EU-BITs, where some Member States and the 
EU seem to be on a collision course. But also in areas where there is less disagreement 
between the main actors questions remain open such the problem of the scope investments to 
be protected in future EU IIAs or the right balance between investment protection and 
regulatory freedom of the Member States and the EU. To another group of open issues belong 
problems rarely addressed in the official debate, such as whether the envisaged continuation 
of ISDS is compatible with the existing EU system of legal protection through the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
108
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A. FDI or more – Does the EU’s new investment power encompass portfolio 
investment?  
Article 206 as well as 207 TFEU are fairly clear; they speak of “foreign direct investment” in 
circumscribing the new CCP power. In spite of this apparently limiting language, the EU 
Commission rejects a narrow reading of its investment powers and asserts that it also includes 
an implied power concerning portfolio investments. Most Member States and also the 
Council, representing Member States’ interests, prefer a more textual interpretation and have 
expressed their view that the EU’s powers are limited to FDI and do not include portfolio 
investments.  
This question is a real and practical problem because modern BITs and IIAs usually cover 
both FDI and portfolio investments.
109
 Thus, for the EU to enter the scene of investment treaty 
players it would be highly unorthodox if it wished to conclude agreements covering only FDI. 
In fact, the EU institutions have clearly expressed their view that future EU IIAs should 
broadly encompass both FDI and portfolio investment.
110
 Therefore it is crucial to know 
whether the EU can conclude IIAs covering both FDI and portfolio investments itself or 
whether it needs the Member States. In the latter case, this would require the conclusion of so-
called mixed agreements to be negotiated and concluded by both the EU and its Member 
States.
111
 From a political perspective this is important since mixed agreements require 
separate ratification by the Member States. Today, this additional weight may appear not so 
crucial since the current rules of CCP treaty-making require unanimity in the Council in 
matters of FDI “where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required 
for the adoption of internal rules.”112 However, the evolution of the EU’s gradual enlargement 
of the CCP has demonstrated a general shift from rule-making dominated by the Member 
States to centralized EC/EU legislation.
113
 Similarly the current unanimity requirement for 
FDI matters in the Council may change in the future. In this situation, only a mixed 
competence would ensure sufficient bargaining power to the individual Member States.  
The conflicting positions can be roughly summarized as follows: In its original 
Communication on an international investment policy, the Commission was not yet very clear 
on that point. It first elaborated on the definition of FDI as an investment “which serves to 
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establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking” without taking a clear stance on 
portfolio investment.
114
 In a subsequent passage, entitled “Looking beyond foreign direct 
investment”, the Commission suggested that “to the extent that international agreements on 
investment affect the scope of the common rules set by the Treaty’s Chapter on capitals and 
payments, the exclusive Union competence to conclude agreements in this area would be 
implied.”115 In its 2012 Financial Responsibility Regulation proposal the Commission is much 
more explicit in asserting that “the Union has exclusive competence to conclude agreements 
covering all matters relating to foreign investment, that is both foreign direct investment and 
portfolio investment.”116 In addition to the express FDI power contained in Article 207 TFEU, 
the Commission clearly postulates an implied power relating to portfolio investment as well:   
“The Union’s competence for portfolio investment stems, in the Commission’s view, 
from Article 63 TFEU. That article provides that the movement of capital between 
Member States of the Union and third countries is to be free of restrictions. Article 
3(2) TFEU provides for the exclusive competence of the Union whenever rules 
included in an international agreement "may affect common rules or alter their scope". 
In the Commission's view, the Union must have exclusive competence also over 
matters of portfolio investment since the rules being envisaged, which would apply 
indistinctly to portfolio investment, may affect the common rules on capital movement 
set down in Article 63 of the Treaty.”117 
Member States in general do not appear to share this view. A very explicit rejection can be 
found in the Lisbon Treaty judgment of the German Constitutional Court which argued as 
follows:  
“The extension of the common commercial policy to “foreign direct investment” 
(Article 207.1 TFEU) confers exclusive competence on the European Union also in 
this area. Much, however, argues in favour of assuming that the term “foreign direct 
investment” only encompasses investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest 
in an enterprise […]. The consequence of this would be that exclusive competence 
only exists for investment of this type whereas investment protection agreements that 
go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed agreements.”118 
The Member State opposition to the Commission’s far-reaching competence claims also 
found its way into the Council’s view. In its October 2012 Conclusions119 commenting on the 
Commission’s plans, the Council is less explicit but clearly stressed that the scope of the EU’s 
exclusive CCP power related to FDI,
120
 and admonished the Commission that the future broad 
investment policy covering all kinds of investment should be further elaborated “in full 
respect of the respective competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the 
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Treaties.”121 A more explicit Council position can be found in its negotiation directives to the 
Commission regarding Canada, India and Singapore in which it requests the Commission to 
aim at including “into the investment protection chapter of the agreement areas of mixed 
competence, such as portfolio investment, […].”122 
While these conflicting interpretations of the scope of the EU’s are easily comprehensible 
from the perspective of the respective EU organ’s institutional interests, the proper 
interpretation remains a difficult issue that has also received much academic attention.
123
  The 
problem of the proper interpretation of the material scope of the EU’s investment power is 
exacerbated by the lack of any meaningful drafting history of the Lisbon Treaty (or for that 
matter of the identically worded Constitution Treaty).  
A limiting interpretation is clearly supported by the wording of the TFEU. The ordinary 
meaning of “foreign direct investment”, as used in Articles 206 and 207 TFEU, comprises 
investment to the exclusion of portfolio investment. While the precise distinction and 
delimitation between FDI and portfolio may be difficult, a number of internationally used 
reference points have been made available by the OECD,
124
 the IMF,
125
 and also the EU has 
adopted secondary legislation on point.
126
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Prima facie, the Commission position is certainly more difficult to defend. Why should the 
new CCP power encompass portfolio investment when only FDI is explicitly mentioned? 
Indeed, recognizing this textual obstacle the Commission suggests seeking an implied 
competence and considers that such an implied external power results from the express 
internal power of the EU to regulate the free movement of capital pursuant to Article 64 
TFEU.
127
 However, a closer look at the established EU doctrine of implied powers shows that 
the expansive interpretation given by the ECJ
128
 and codified in the TFEU
129
 is likely to be 
continued by the CJEU. In the field of investment this would make it probable that, if called 
to rule on such issue, the Court would consider also portfolio investment that can be regulated 
on the basis of Article 63
130
 and 64 TFEU to be covered by the EU’s implied external powers.  
The question is likely to remain a theoretical problem since in practice the Council will not 
consent to a broad investment agreement suggested by the Commission without Member 
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States participation. Thus, the intended broad scope of investment protection
131
 will require 
close cooperation between the Commission and the Member States.  
B. Should future EU IIAs protect all forms of investments?  
Independent from the question of the allocation of treaty-making power for FDI “plus/minus 
portfolio investment” is the policy question whether future EU or mixed agreements covering 
investment should broadly cover all forms of investment or be more selective. This question is 
linked to a debate often addressed by critics of the current investment protection system who 
wish to differentiate between “useful”, “genuine”, “legitimate” investment that should be 
attracted by special host state protection and unwelcome forms of investment. This debate is 
related to the development impact discussion which led many capital importing countries to 
adopt admission requirements in order to screen useful investments and to disallow 
unwelcome investments.
132
 A similar effect was intended by so-called performance 
requirements; however, due to the fact that most IIAs and in particular trade treaties consider 
performance requirements to be distortive of competition they are generally less and less 
used.
133
  
Today, such concerns have been taken up by the EU Parliament which has espoused calls for 
limiting investment protection to “non-speculative” investments. However, uncertainty stems 
from the fact that the Parliament has expressly called for the exclusion of “speculative forms 
of investment”.134 In practice, it would appear difficult to distinguish between “speculative” 
and “non-speculative” portfolio (or even direct) investment. Neither the Parliament nor any 
other EU institution has offered any precise definition of “non-speculative” investments that 
should enjoy future IIA protection, though Parliament specifically requested Commission to 
provide a clear definition of what kind of the investments should be protected.
135
 In its 
reaction, the Commission pointed towards the difficulty of such a distinction and stressed that 
“speculative” investment should not be equated with portfolio investment.136 It also suggested 
that speculative forms of investment would not be protected by future investment agreements 
because such agreements regularly do not protect “ordinary commercial transactions” and by 
extension not “short term investments”.137 
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It is true that investment tribunals, both ICSID and non-ICSID panels, have developed 
techniques to distinguish between “investments” and “ordinary commercial transactions” with 
the effect that the latter would not fall under the protection of investment tribunals. Through 
the precise limitation may be difficult, tribunals have consistently held that purely commercial 
transactions such as sales contracts or the acquisition of “receivables” from a private company 
do not qualify as investments.
138
 
However, “ordinary commercial transactions” often are far from speculative “transactions”, 
but rather relate to the payment for goods or services. Thus, the lack of protection for 
“ordinary commercial transactions” does not imply that “short term investments” or even 
“speculative” investments would be automatically excluded as a result of the established 
jurisprudence of investment tribunals to exclude “ordinary commercial transactions” from the 
notion of “investments”.  
In the practice of investment protection, similar concerns about “unwelcome” investments 
have been addressed in different ways. One approach of distinguishing between welcome and 
unwelcome types of investment can be found in the discussion of an implied “investment” 
notion under the ICSID Convention which clearly goes beyond the mere differentiation 
between “investments” and “ordinary commercial transactions”.139 ICSID jurisprudence has 
developed a test concerning the jurisdictional requirement of an “investment” pursuant to 
Article 25 ICSID Convention and given different weight, in particular, to the notion of a 
contribution to the host state development.
140
 Since the Salini case, a certain contribution to 
the host state development figures prominently in ICSID case-law nest to a certain duration, 
risk participation and a certain total value contribution when it comes to define the unwritten 
jurisdictional requirement of an “investment”.141 
Similar to the non-written contribution to the host state development element, the non-
speculative character of an investment could be regarded as a jurisdictional requirement in 
future EU IIAs – one that may even be expressly laid down in such treaties. An explicit 
inscription of such a requirement would certainly avoid problems along the line of the long-
standing ICSID controversy whether the “contribution”-requirement is an intended part of the 
25 notion of investments.
142
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
protecting established investors within the host state. […] As far as the Commission is aware, up to now no 
tribunal has ever decided upon a dispute arising out of a short term investment in the capital market of the host 
state.”).  
138
 See, e.g., Global Trading Resources Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/11, Award (Dec. 1, 2010), para. 56 (“[P]urchase and sale contracts entered into by the Claimants were 
pure commercial transactions and therefore cannot qualify as an investment for the purposes of Article 25 of the 
Convention.”); Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 5 March 2011, considering that a “mere 
one-off sale transaction” would not qualify as an investment. 
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 See supra text at note 136.  
140
 See C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2
nd
 ed., 
2009) 128 et seq. 
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 See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, para. 52 (“The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: 
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction 
[…]. In reading the Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic development of the 
host State of the investment as an additional condition.”).  
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 While the annulment committee in Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, (Nov. 1, 2006), as well as the sole 
arbitrator in Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on 
Jurisdiction (May 17, 2007), regarded the lack of “contribution” crucial for denying jurisdiction, the tribunal in 
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However, as with the opaque notion of the “contribution” to the host state development, there 
remains the problem of the proper identification of non-speculative investments. ICSID cases 
that have relied on the need to demonstrate a contribution to the host state development have 
often taken rather subjective concepts when deciding that the services of a law firm or the 
salvaging operations for historical ships do not contribute to such development.
143
 While the 
underlying rationale may have been a crude preference for green-field FDI, there is no clear 
explanation why the provision of legal services or the development of aqua-touristic sites or 
museums should not contribute to the development of host states.  
Another technique to address concerns about “illegitimate” investments is the limitation of 
investment protection to investment “in accordance with the law of the host state.”144 A 
number of IIAs expressly contain such clauses and various investment tribunals have held that 
they lacked jurisdiction over claims concerning investments not made “in accordance with the 
law of the host state.”145 For instance, already in 2005, an ICSID tribunal in Salini v. 
Morocco
146
 had found that such a BIT clause excluded from its protection investments made 
illegally and in 2006, the tribunals in Inceysa v. El Salvador
147
 and Fraport v. Philippines
148
 
reiterated this view and denied their jurisdiction on the basis of such clauses because the 
investors had fraudulently and thus illegally procured their investment. However, such cases 
have introduced a considerable level of uncertainty since they have not yet been able to draw 
a clear line what degree of “illegality” is required to deprive investors of investment 
protection.
149
 A further complication stems from recent ICSID cases that have incorporated 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 14 July 2010, para. 111, rejected the 
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para. 190. 
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 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 16 
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the “in accordance with the law of the host state”-requirement into the general notion of 
“investment”150 pursuant to Article 25 ICSID Convention.151 
Similarly, practical problems are likely to arise should the EU adopt such plans to carve out 
“speculative” investments from the broad and all-encompassing investment definition. The 
uncertainty surrounding the proper notion of “investment” was clearly damaging for ICSID 
and may in the long run deter investors from using ICSID, relying on UNCITRAL
152
 or other 
investment arbitration rules instead which do not have such a requirement. In a similar way, 
uncertainty about the exact scope of protected investment could be damaging for future EU 
IIAs because it might insert a considerable degree of unpredictability as to the jurisdictional 
threshold to be overcome in order to hear a dispute on the merits.  
C. The integration of broader, non-economic concerns into future EU IIAs  
The emergence of effective investment protection since the late 1990s primarily through the 
availability of effective ISDS has led to a growing uneasiness among many host states, 
including some EU Member States, fearing that too effective investment protection may 
become too costly and ultimately deter from adopting legitimate policy measures.
153
 This true 
or perceived danger of a so-called regulatory chill
154
 has led to outright denunciation of the 
current system
155
 and (even in OECD countries) to attempts to moderate investment 
protection by balancing investor concerns with governmental interests.
156
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These anxieties have also been picked up by the EU institutions. In its 2010 Communication, 
the Commission stated with regard to the potential breadth of indirect expropriation that “[a] 
clear formulation of the balance between the different interests at stake, such as the protection 
of investors against unlawful expropriation or the right of each Party to regulate in the public 
interest, needs to be ensured.”157 It further stated that “Investment agreements should be 
consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies on 
the protection of the environment, decent work, health and safety at work, consumer 
protection, cultural diversity, development policy and competition policy.”158 These concerns 
are shared in principle by the Council, admonishing in its Negotiating Directives with Canada, 
India, and Singapore the need to guarantee an appropriate regulatory space for the EU and its 
Member States by cautioning that an EU investment agreement “shall be without prejudice to 
the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance with their 
respective competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives 
such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a non-discriminatory 
manner.”159  
Such language is reminiscent of the police powers doctrine,
160
 as endorsed by some 
investment tribunals
161
 and found in the explanatory parts of US
162
 and Canadian
163
 Model 
BITs. It will leave considerable leeway for treaty negotiators to draft the respective treatment 
standards and possible exception clauses. These concerns were even reinforced by the 
European Parliament which expressed its irritation with the regulatory chill of investment 
arbitration
164
 and specifically called upon the Commission “to include in all future agreements 
specific clauses laying down the right of parties to the agreement to regulate, inter alia, in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this 
Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
health, safety or environmental concerns.”).  
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 Commission Communication, COM(2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 9. 
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 Ibid. 
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 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26.  
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 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 712 Comment g, at 201 (“[…] 
action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states.”). 
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general regulations that are “commonly accepted as within the police power of States” forms part of customary 
international law today.”) 
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 See Annex B on Expropriation 4(b) US Model BIT 2004 (“Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”) 
163
 See Annex B.13(1) on Expropriation Canadian Model FIPA 2004 (“Except in rare circumstances, such as 
when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably 
viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, 
do not constitute indirect expropriation.”) 
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 Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. G (“[…] a number of problems became clear because of the use 
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areas of protection of national security, the environment, public health, workers’ and 
consumers’ rights, industrial policy and cultural diversity.”165 In its response, the Commission 
pointed to the EU’s practice to include a general right to regulate in its FTAs and that it 
intends to continue this practice in its negotiations.
166
  
While finding the proper balance between investment and non-investment interests will 
indeed be one of the core issues for future EU IIAs,
167
 it is questionable whether the 
incorporation of standard clauses preserving the contracting states’ right to regulate which 
accomplish that goal. At present there is not yet sufficient practice to determine how 
investment tribunals would interpret such general clauses in order to assess whether the 
intended effect can be achieved.  
D. Consequences of the shift of treaty-making powers for existing Member State 
BITs with third parties  
With the intensifying discussion over the content of future EU IIAs, the initial debate about 
the future of existing Member State BITs “after Lisbon” has receded.168 Nevertheless, what 
was clearly recognized as a crucial issue of legal certainty early on remains an important and 
still unsolved problem. The problem’s core is easy to describe. If and to the extent that the EU 
has acquired an exclusive competence over investment matters, such shift of powers leads to a 
corresponding loss of powers on the part of the Member States.  
As a consequence, existing Member State BITs become “unconstitutional” under EU law. Of 
course, this does not automatically affect their validity under international law but from the 
perspective of EU law the exclusive CCP power implies that only the EU can lawfully enter 
into and be a partner to treaties with third countries addressing subject-matters covered by the 
CCP.  
Since this “loss” of Member State powers took effect with the entry-into-force of the Lisbon 
Treaty on 1 December 2009, a quick pragmatic solution had to be found. In fact, EU law 
permits the Union to authorize the Member States to act in fields of its own exclusive 
powers.
169
 Such a re-transfer of powers was envisaged early on in the July 2010 Commission 
proposal for a so-called grandfathering regulation
170
 which would authorize Member State 
BITs through a grant back of competences. Reportedly, the Commission had already 
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informally signalled to its Member States that it would consent to their continued negotiation 
and conclusion of BITs with third states.
171
   
The Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment treaties between Member States and third countries
172
 
which was made public by the Commission in summer 2010 basically lays down “the terms, 
conditions and the procedure under which Member States are authorised to maintain in force, 
amend or conclude bilateral agreements with third countries relating to investment.”173 Such 
authorization should be given as a matter of course with regard to duly notified Member State 
BITs as long as they do not conflict with EU law, overlap with EU treaties or obstruct the 
EU’s investment policy.174 
However, the Proposal did not meet unanimous approval by the Member States because it 
included rather stringent Commission screening powers of existing BITs as well IIAs to be 
negotiated and concluded by Member States in the future.
175
 Member States apparently fear 
the loss of control and have a sense of being more and more at the mercy of the Commission 
with regard to their investment policies.   
This Member State reluctance towards the draft grandfathering regulation may be one of the 
reasons why it has remained only a proposal since summer 2010. As of December 2012, the 
draft proposal still has not yet been adopted. However, this is not only a timing problem but 
also one of defective legal certainty. As long as there is no explicit legal basis existing 
Member State BITs are no longer in conformity with EU law. Although the Commission is 
currently unlikely to institute legal proceedings against Member States, the fact that it did 
pursue such a course of action with regard to comparatively minor EU law inconsistencies in 
the cases concerning the transfer provisions of Austrian, Finish and Swedish BITs
176
 has 
alerted Member States that legal action is not excluded.  
E. The impact on intra-EU-BITs 
An issue related to the question of the effect of the transfer of IIA powers on existing Member 
State BITs with third countries is the question whether the new investment competence of the 
EU implies that BITs concluded among Member States, so-called intra-EU-BITs, have 
become incompatible with EU law and whether such potential incompatibility implies their 
automatic termination or requires that they be terminated by the Member States.
177
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In the course of a number of investment arbitrations, some Member States (in their role as 
respondents) have in fact asserted that the incompatibility between intra-EU-BITs and EU law 
would lead to the formers’ automatic termination.178 The Commission has been slightly more 
cautious by asserting that such incompatibility would not lead to an automatic termination, 
but rather require the Member States to terminate their intra-EU-BITs.
179
  
Investment tribunals have generally rejected the claim that intra-EU-BITs and EU law would 
be incompatible as matter of treaty law. As a result they have usually upheld their jurisdiction 
based on the continued validity of intra-EU-BITs. The Eastern Sugar tribunal rejected the 
argument that the alleged incompatibility would have led to an automatic treaty termination 
pursuant to Article 59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
180
 holding that the 
Czech Republic/Netherlands BIT and EU law did “not cover the same precise subject-
matter.”181 Similarly, the tribunal in Eureko v. Slovakia182 dismissed the “intra-EU 
jurisdictional objection”, holding that the BIT provisions have “not been displaced by EU 
law” as a result of Article 59 VCLT,183 nor have they been “disapplied by EU law” as a result 
of Article 30 VCLT.
184
 
The issue may of course be largely a question of perspective. From an EU law perspective, 
the incompatibility may stem, for instance, from the fact that intra-EU-BITs grant nationals of 
specific EU Member States procedural rights like ISDS that would not be available to other 
EU nationals and thus lead to discrimination.
185
 Under accepted EU principles like 
supremacy/primacy it would clearly follow that any inconsistence between EU law and 
national law must lead to a “disapplication” of national law.186 In the opinion of the 
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Commission this overriding effect also applies vis-à-vis treaties concluded by Member 
States.
187
  
From the perspective of international law, any potential incompatibility between intra-EU-
BITs and EU law must be assessed on the basis of treaty law rules concerning successive 
treaty obligations. Thus, investment tribunals have assessed such incompatibility arguments 
on the basis of the rules on successive treaties codified in Articles 30
188
 and 59
189
 VCLT.
190
 
On this basis, the fact that intra-EU-BITs may provide investors with different or more rights 
than EU law does not necessarily mean that these two systems are incompatible.
191
 Even the 
fact that procedural rights like access to ISDS may be discriminatorily available only to some 
EU nationals as a result of an intra-EU-BIT does not imply that the two treaties are 
incompatible.
192
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In spite of, or maybe because of, the predominantly positive attitude of investment tribunals 
towards the continued validity of intra-EU-BITs, the Commission continues to pressure EU 
Member States to terminate them.
193
 
F. Compatibility of ISDS with the system of legal protection by the Court of Justice 
of the EU 
Also the debate concerning ISDS has shifted quite remarkably. While at first it seemed 
uncertain whether the EU institutions would espouse the concept of ISDS as such or rather go 
for the Calvo-inspired, Australia-US BIT approach to abandon it outright and to rely 
exclusively on domestic courts,
194
 the gradual endorsement of ISDS by the Commission and 
the Council and, subsequently though less enthusiastically, also by the Parliament led to 
questions concerning the necessary adaptations to account for the fact that the EU is not a 
state, but rather a highly integrated supranational organization. In particular more technical 
issues concerning the potential accessibility of ICSID have been raised and remain unresolved 
hitherto.
195
    
An issue that has received much less attention by the EU institutions is the question of the 
general compatibility of ISDS with the system of legal protection guaranteed by the CJEU.
196
 
Concern has been voiced that the Court of Justice may regard any “competing” dispute 
settlement institution as an “unconstitutional” threat to the autonomy of EU law and its own 
exclusive power to interpret it.
197
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These concerns stem from a line of ECJ cases that have vigilantly safeguarded the spheres of 
exclusive jurisdiction enjoyed by the Court as the sole authentic interpreter of Community, 
now Union law. The judicial autonomy claim is based on the EU’s constituent treaty which 
provides not only for various forms of exclusive competence of the CJEU, but also for an 
explicit prohibition for the Member States to have their EU law related disputes settled by any 
other court or tribunal.
198
   
This latter prohibition played an important role in the so-called MOX Plant case
199
 in which 
the Commission successfully brought infringement proceedings against Ireland because the 
latter had instituted arbitral proceedings against the UK under the UN Law of the Sea 
Convention.
200
 In the view of the ECJ, the law of the sea issues raised in that arbitration came 
within the scope of Community competence and were thus part of a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of Community law.
201
  
Since both the MOX Plant case as well as Article 344 TFEU expressly refer to inter-state 
disputes it is unlikely that investor-state arbitration would be regarded incompatible with this 
form of exclusivity.
202
 However, from a broader perspective it cannot be excluded that the 
CJEU might find fault in a system of ISDS regularly provided for in future EU IIAs where 
such investor-state arbitration tribunals may deal with questions of EU law. This could be the 
case if the Court followed an interpretation given to the nature of investment arbitration as the 
procedural option for private parties to enforce the international law claims of their home 
states.
203
 In order to understand the background of such a possible curb on ISDS by the CJEU 
it is important to appreciate the Court’s past case-law and position vis-à-vis its potential 
judicial competitors.  
The first clear manifestation of such a defensive stance can be found in the Court’s Advisory 
Opinion on the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement
204
 which intended to set up a 
parallel system of judicial protection covering both the EC and EFTA states joined in the EEA 
enterprise. While the ECJ found that the Community’s treaty-making power in the field of an 
enlarged free trade agreement comprised also the power to agree on binding dispute 
settlement,
205
 it considerably limited this position by holding that such a dispute settlement 
institution would be prevented from ruling on issues concerning the allocation of competences 
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between the EC and its Member States
206
 which fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court.
207
 This attitude was confirmed by the Court’s Opinion on the establishment of a 
European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) which equally stressed the need for an 
autonomous EC legal order which would prevent an international dispute settlement 
mechanism from rendering binding interpretations of EC law.
208
 
More recently, in its Opinion on the European and Community Patents Courts
209
 the Court of 
Justice reiterated its reserved position towards “foreign judges” who might rule on EU law. 
With regard to the envisaged patent courts that would have had exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide patent cases, the Court of Justice cautioned that such a system would deprive it of the 
possibility to make preliminary rulings on requests from Member State courts and would thus 
threaten the uniform interpretation and application of EU law guaranteed by the Court.
210
 In 
other words, the Court of Justice appears to give increasing weight to its own role as the 
guardian of the true interpretation of EU law whether in direct actions or indirectly through 
the system of preliminary references. That role is regarded threatened by “foreign” courts 
which do not submit to the CJEU’s ultimate interpretive power.  
The implications for ISDS are uncertain. However, it cannot be excluded that the CJEU 
would consider investor-state arbitration incompatible with such a far-reaching interpretation 
of its own interpretive prerogatives. The question appears to turn on the degree to which 
investor-state arbitration tribunals are likely to interpret and apply EU law in the future. One 
such crucial area is the question of the attribution of acts or omissions causing harm to foreign 
investors that is relevant not only for the question who is likely to be a respondent in ISDS 
proceedings, but also for the ultimate responsibility. To decide such questions an investment 
tribunal would clearly “have to rule on the respective competences of the [Union] and the 
Member States as regards the matters governed by the provisions of the agreement.”211 It 
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seems that a mechanism like the one adopted for the determination of the roles in investment 
arbitration for purposes of the ECT
212
 would sufficiently safeguard the required autonomy of 
the EU institutions. Where such issues concerning the internal distribution of competences are 
insulated from the determination by ISDS, the autonomy would seem to be guaranteed. Much 
more problematic appear cases where investor-state arbitral tribunals may be called upon to 
directly apply EU law in the course of assessing the claims of an investor. That is particularly 
likely if future EU IIAs contain applicable law clauses
213
 which would not be limited to the 
treaty standards and possibly customary international law,
214
 but rather encompass the law of 
the host state.
215
 In such a situation investment tribunals may have to rule on EU law which 
could be regarded as an infringement of the exclusive power of the CJEU to interpret EU law. 
One possibility to remedy such a potential incompatibility of ISDS with EU law is hinted to in 
the European and Community Patents Courts Opinion where the CJEU seemed to suggest 
that it was the non-availability of the preliminary reference proceeding by the planned patent 
courts which caused the incompatibility.
216
 One could thus presume that as long as the 
envisaged dispute settlement mechanism offered a possibility to allow preliminary references 
it should be viewed as compatible with the CJEU’s claim to have the final word on the 
interpretation of EU law. Apart from the question whether the EU’s future IIA partners would 
agree to such a possibility, a practical problem seems to stem from another line of CJEU 
jurisprudence. In the past, the Court has consistently given a rather narrow interpretation to 
the notion of a “tribunal” which according to Article 267 TFEU is entitled to request a 
preliminary ruling.
217
 According to the CJEU’s case-law, such bodies must exercise public 
authority on behalf of Member States and possess independent judicial tasks.
218
 Since the 
Nordsee case,
219
 the Court has held that commercial arbitration tribunal are a form of private 
and not state dispute settlement and thus do not qualify as “tribunals” entitled to request 
preliminary rulings. While it is not excluded to view mixed investor-state arbitration as 
different from purely private arbitration, it may still be difficult to see the required link to a 
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Member State,
220
 though it has been suggested that one could regard treaty-based arbitration 
as arbitration being based on national law.
221
 Thus, any suggestions to remedy the uncertain 
situation by “upgrading”222 investor-state tribunals to “tribunals” entitled to make preliminary 
references in order to make the system of ISDS compatible with EU law remain fraught with 
difficulties.  
VII. Conclusions  
After initial concerns about the EU’s investment policy to be carried out by the Commission, 
which were fuelled by the latter’s reluctance to take clear positions on a wide range of crucial 
issues, it now appears that, three years after the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty, some 
contours of future EU IIAs are beginning to emerge, seemingly also still recognizable as 
“European”. It is to be expected that future EU IIAs will largely resemble the typical BITs 
concluded by its Member States, though there may be a few additions in particular in the field 
of ensuring sufficient regulatory space for host states and addressing some recent concerns 
surrounding ISDS.  
However, there still remain a number of open questions: Will the EU alone be competent to 
conclude IIAs covering both FDI and portfolio investment? Is it possible and is it in the 
interest of the EU to protect only certain kinds of investment? What will happen to existing 
BITs and other IIAs concluded by the Member States with third parties; what with intra-EU-
BITs? Will the CJEU accept a system of ISDS that may have implications on the 
interpretation and application of EU law? While many of these questions will have to be 
addressed in the current effort to shape a future EU investment policy it is likely that the final 
word will come from the CJEU … and that maybe only in a few years.  
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